Design Principles for AI Agents

Rules for systems in which an AI agent can move money, set prices, grant refunds, take orders or commit the company. Each one comes from the register, and earns its status from evidence.

Version 0.2, released October 19, 2026. Derived from the Gamed AI Agents Register v0.2. 11 principles: 5 supported, 6 emerging.

How status is earned

Each principle comes from the register: its absence contributed to a loss or a near miss. A principle earns its status from evidence, not from how good it sounds.

Supported
Two or more losses graded A or B in which its absence contributed
Emerging
One such loss, or evidence only from near misses, attempts or demonstrations
Hypothesis
No entry yet

At a glance

IDPrincipleStatusEntries
DP-01Authority lives outside the conversationSupported001 002 003 004 008 009 010
DP-02Hard limits the conversation can’t changeSupported001 002 003 004 008 009 010 012
DP-03Permissions change only by an authenticated owner actionSupported008 012
DP-04Inputs are data, not instructionsSupported002 003 005 006 007 008 011 012
DP-05Know whose agent you’re dealing withEmerging006 007
DP-06Check the action against the requestEmerging010
DP-07Irreversible or first-time transfers need independent confirmationSupported002 003 006 010 011 012
DP-08Agents hold only what the task needsEmerging012
DP-09Guardrails are code, with regression testsEmerging012
DP-10Record what the agent was told, what it decided and whyEmerging003 005
DP-11Design for recoveryEmerging012

Entries are listed by number: 012 is AGT-012.

Authority

DP-01Supported

Authority lives outside the conversation

An agent can propose an action. A separate, deterministic policy layer decides whether it happens. Nothing said to the agent, by anyone, can grant authority, because authority is checked somewhere the conversation can’t reach.

Why
In most of the losses, the decision to move money was made inside the conversation: a game agent decided to call its own transfer function, a trading agent answered a sob story, and a shopkeeper agent agreed to give stock away.
In practice
  • The model emits a proposed action, such as a transfer, discount or order. A rules engine approves or rejects it against policy.
  • The model never holds signing keys or the ability to change prices directly.
Evidence
Cost
More engineering: a policy layer between the model and anything that moves value.

DP-02Supported

Hard limits the conversation can’t change

Per-action caps, daily caps, allow-lists, and price and discount floors are enforced in code. The agent can’t talk its way past them, and nobody can talk the agent past them.

Why
No case had a limit that capped the loss. One agent sent tokens worth about $441,000 in answer to a request for $310. Another gave away nearly all its stock. A third had its transfer limits bypassed.
In practice
  • Order desk: discounts above a floor and free goods are impossible without a human.
  • Wallets and payables: per-transfer and daily caps, and payments only to allow-listed destinations.
Evidence
Cost
Some legitimate actions need a human above the cap.

DP-03Supported

Permissions change only by an authenticated owner action

An agent’s permissions, limits and sense of who is in charge change only through an authenticated action by its owner. They never change as a side effect of something arriving, such as a token, a document or a message.

Why
A gifted membership NFT reportedly unlocked a wallet’s full transfer permissions. A reporter’s fake board-minutes PDF changed who a vending agent believed was in charge.
In practice
  • Inbound assets and documents never change permissions. Treat ‘inbound’ as untrusted.
  • Changes to an agent’s limits or governing documents are signed by the owner and logged.
Evidence
Cost
Owners must sign off on permission changes.

Inputs

DP-04Supported

Inputs are data, not instructions

Messages, web pages, documents, memories and other agents’ outputs can inform an agent. They never command it. A command comes only from an authenticated principal, through a channel built for commands.

Why
Bankr treated Grok’s public reply as the owner’s command. A trading agent acted on malicious replies queued into its prompts. Hidden text on web pages tells visiting agents to pay. False ‘memories’ can steer an agent’s later actions.
In practice
  • Commands arrive through a separate, authenticated channel (a signed request or API key), never inside content the agent reads.
  • Agent-to-agent: one agent’s output is data for the next agent unless it is cryptographically tied to an authorized principal.
Evidence
Cost
Less ‘magic’: agents can’t act on anything they read.

DP-05Emerging

Know whose agent you’re dealing with

When the counterparty is an AI agent, verify whose agent it is and what it is authorized to do before you extend terms, accept a high-value order or pay it.

Why
In Microsoft’s simulated marketplace, fake credentials steered buyer agents. Payment networks are building ways to recognize agents: Visa’s Trusted Agent Protocol (October 2025), and Proof and Circle’s demonstration (October 2026) of agents proving who they act for.
In practice
  • Order desk: identify the agent’s owner, and confirm limits on first orders placed by agents.
Evidence
Cost
Depends on standards that are still settling.

Execution

DP-06Emerging

Check the action against the request

Before executing, compare the action’s amount, recipient and asset against what was actually asked for and what is normal. Stop on a mismatch.

Why
Asked for 4 SOL (about $310), an agent sent 52.4 million tokens worth about $441,000 at the time. A simple sanity check between the request and the transfer would have stopped it.
In practice
  • Unit and decimal checks, and a comparison of the transfer’s value with the request’s value.
  • Flag anything far outside the agent’s normal range.
Evidence
Cost
Cheap; a few lines of validation.

DP-07Supported

Irreversible or first-time transfers need independent confirmation

A human, or a second system the agent doesn’t control, confirms high-value, irreversible or first-time transfers through its own channel.

Why
None of the crypto losses had a second confirmation. Each transfer executed on the first instruction, to a wallet the agent had never paid before.
In practice
  • Above a threshold, or for any new destination, the transfer waits for confirmation.
  • Confirmation happens outside the conversation that produced the request.
Evidence
Cost
Slower for genuinely new counterparties.

DP-08Emerging

Agents hold only what the task needs

An agent’s wallet, credit line and permissions are sized to its task, not to what’s convenient.

Why
Bankr auto-provisioned a wallet for Grok’s X account. By the time of the attack it held a large token balance and had no admin at xAI.
In practice
  • Sweep balances above working needs to accounts the agent can’t touch.
  • Give agents scoped permissions per task, and expire them.
Evidence
Cost
More account management.

Engineering and recovery

DP-09Emerging

Guardrails are code, with regression tests

Every control is written down as a test that runs on every release. A control that can disappear in a rewrite isn’t a control.

Why
Bankr said an earlier version blocked Grok’s replies precisely to stop this kind of chain, but that safeguard was dropped in a full rewrite.
In practice
  • Keep an attack test suite: past incidents become test cases that must fail safely.
  • Release gates check that limits, blocks and allow-lists still hold.
Evidence
Cost
Test maintenance.

DP-10Emerging

Record what the agent was told, what it decided and why

For every action that moves value, keep the inputs the agent saw, the instruction it acted on, its stated reason and the policy decision, tied to the transaction.

Why
In the AIXBT case, the team and the reporting still disagree on whether the agent was manipulated or the system was breached. A decision record would settle it, and it is what any later dispute, insurer or regulator will ask for.
In practice
  • Log the prompt context, tool calls and policy checks for each value-moving action.
  • Keep the logs where the agent can’t edit them.
Note
This is the signature principle: today, most systems can’t show why an agent moved money.
Evidence
Cost
Storage and privacy handling.

DP-11Emerging

Design for recovery

Build delays, escrow or reversal windows, and a kill switch into agent transfers, so a mistake can be stopped before it settles.

Why
In the Grok case, about 80% came back only after the community identified the attacker. That was luck and social pressure, not a control.
In practice
  • Time-delay large transfers, with an automatic hold on anomalies.
  • A kill switch that freezes an agent’s ability to move value.
Evidence
Cost
Slower settlement.

Attribution matrix

Which principles were missing in each entry

Entries in rows, principles in columns. A red square means the principle was missing.
EntryDP-01DP-02DP-03DP-04DP-05DP-06DP-07DP-08DP-09DP-10DP-11
AGT-001Chevrolet of Watsonville(Near miss)missingmissing
AGT-002Freysa(Loss)missingmissingmissingmissing
AGT-003AIXBT(Loss)missingmissingmissingmissingmissing
AGT-004Project Vend(Loss)missingmissing
AGT-005ElizaOS(Demonstration)missingmissing
AGT-006Comet test(Demonstration)missingmissingmissing
AGT-007Magentic Marketplace(Demonstration)missingmissing
AGT-008The Wall Street Journal’s vending machine(Loss)missingmissingmissingmissing
AGT-009UK shop(Near miss)missingmissing
AGT-010Lobstar Wilde(Loss)missingmissingmissingmissing
AGT-011In the wild(Attempt)missingmissing
AGT-012Grok and Bankr(Loss)missingmissingmissingmissingmissingmissingmissing

For a distributor’s order desk, payables and credit

These principles were derived from crypto wallets and shops, because that’s where agents hold money today. They carry over directly:

  • Order desk: an agent quoting prices or accepting orders gets a price book and discount floor it can’t change (DP-02). Buyers’ messages and documents are data (DP-04). An order from another company’s agent is checked for whose agent it is (DP-05).
  • Payables: an agent paying invoices pays only allow-listed vendors under caps (DP-02). It never changes vendor bank details because a document arrived (DP-03). New payees wait for independent confirmation (DP-07).
  • Credit: an agent approving terms can’t raise a limit because a message or a reference letter says so (DP-03, DP-04). Every approval records what the agent saw and why it decided (DP-10).

How the principles change

  • Every new entry gets mapped. A gap no principle covers becomes a candidate principle. A principle that was in place and still failed gets refined.
  • Status moves with evidence, up as qualifying losses accumulate, and down if entries show a principle doesn’t hold.
  • Wording changes are logged in the change log below.
  • Target: version 1.0 in May 2027.

Change log

v0.2, October 19, 2026
Rebuilt for systems in which AI agents hold authority. 11 principles: 5 supported, 6 emerging. The v0.1 principles, which were about humans deceived by AI-made fakes, are retired. Their system-level ideas carry over: authority outside the conversation (DP-01), first-time destinations (DP-07), recovery (DP-11), recording what was checked (DP-10) and knowing whose agent you’re dealing with (DP-05).